EKONOMSKE KATASTROFE - ŠTO ZAISTA ZNAMO? by Vinko Muštra
69
ECONOMIC DISASTERS – WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW?
Vinko Muštra, Ass. prof1
ECONOMIC DISASTERS – WHAT DO WE REALLY 
KNOW?
Prethodno priopćenje / Preliminary communication
UDK 338.14
After recent global fi nancial and economic crisis interest in potential eff ects of especially 
large economic crisis, called economic disasters has been increased. This study analyzes 
determinants of size and recovery phase of economic disasters from 1960 up to 2014 
among 214 countries. The results reveal diff erences between scale and duration of eco-
nomic disasters. Some possible factors shaping these patterns are explored indicating the 
importance of institutions and investments for scale of disasters, and human capital and 
fi nancial sectors for duration phase. 
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1. Introduction
Recent global fi nancial and economic crisis has raised interest in economic crisis, espe-
cially rare extreme economic events with signifi cant and devastating economic eff ects, 
called economic disasters. 
The data set constructed by Barro and Ursúa’s (2008, 2012) and recent devastating crisis 
have been motivation for large number of papers addressing the link between economic 
disasters and large number of economic phenomena (e.g. Barro 2009; Barro and Ursúa 2012; 
Gourio 2012, 2013; Pindyck and Wang 2013; Aizenman and Noy 2015; Barro and Jin 2016; 
Farhi and Gabaix 2016; Ćorić 2017; Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal 2018; Rebelo, Wang, 
and Yang 2018).
However, the dataset constructed by Barro and Ursúa’s (2008, 2012) also off ered some 
limitations recognized and bypassed in the new data sets constructed by Coric (2019).  
In fi rst place, the new data sets off ered more profound empirical tool to analyze not only 
the existence, but also diff erent perspectives of these rare and extreme economics shocks for 
longer time and among larger number of the countries.
On theoretical side, shocks have recently become a prominent subject of enquiry and 
interest has been expressively utilized under the term resilience (e.g. Bristow, 2010; Simmie 
and Martin, 2010; Martin, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015, Bristow and Healy, 2015; Martin and 
Gardiner, 2019). 
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Resilience, as a way of conceptualizing and analyzing how economies react to and recover 
from disturbances and disruptions (Martin and Gardiner, 2019) represents proper framework 
for understanding specifi c perspective of economic disasters. 
Several questions could arise from such a perspective. Do economies actually diff er in 
their resilience to size of shocks, especially in their duration of such disruptions? What causes 
such diff erences? (Martin and Gardiner, 2019)
Considering, up to the knowledge of author, that there is no empirical research analyzing 
diff erent elements of economic disasters, this paper deals not only with the economic deter-
minants important for the size of economic disasters, but also with the factors important for 
the relative duration of economic disasters.
The paper is organized as follows. Literature review has been presented in section 2. Sec-
tion 3 describes the used data set and methodology and results of empirical analysis. Con-
cluding remarks are described in section 4. 
2. Literature review
Recent economic shocks on global level off ered reminder that shocks are frequent and 
regular part of the economic development and growth process (Cook et al, 2013).   
Economic theory off ered evidence for positive eff ects of shocks indicating that shocks 
can provide stimulus for fi rms to innovate and become more competitive. As a consequence, 
although the analysis of shocks as a part of business cycles and related fl uctuations theo-
retical framework has long been a topic of theoretical and econometric enquiry (e.g. Lucas, 
1977; Long and Plosser, 1983; Hansen, 1985; Cooley, 1995; Romer, 2011), shocks have not 
represented a major concern for the mainstream economic researches.
However, recent global economic turmoil prompts us that shocks can produce immedi-
ate agonizing eff ects for the places and people implicated, and, as consequence, it should be 
in epicenter of the economic policy concerns.
Shocks can take various forms, in terms of origin, nature, scale, duration and scope. The 
goal of this paper is to examine more closely the especially large economic shocks, called 
economic disasters.
The term economic disaster has been presented by Barro (2006) to identify especially 
large economic crises, later defi ned as a cumulative decline in output over one or more years 
of at least 10 percent.
To deal with the eff ects of newly introduced phenomena Barro and Ursúa’s (2008, 2012) 
constructed data set based on historical output data for 42 OECD and non OECD countries.
On this basis, the literature addressed the eff ects of the economic disasters on asset-pric-
ing puzzles (Barro and Ursúa 2012; Gabaix 2012; Gourio 2012, 2013; Tsai and Wachter 2015; 
Barro and Jin, 2016; Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal, 2018), but also on saving, investment, 
debt intolerance of developing economies, exchange rate, long-run output growth and wel-
fare (Barro, 2009; Gourio, 2012, 2013; Pindyck and Wang, 2013; Aizenman and Noy 2015; Farhi 
and Gabaix, 2016, Ćorić, 2017; Rebelo, Wang, and Yang 2018). 
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However, the dataset constructed by Barro and Ursúa’s (2008, 2012) also off ered limita-
tions recognized by Coric (2019). The author created the new data sets covering larger num-
ber of countries for longer time.  In addition, by providing more details on each economic 
disaster it opened new horizons for a variety of empirical researches on economic disasters. 
In fi rst place, the new data sets off ered more profound empirical tool to analyze not only the 
existence, but also diff erent perspectives of these rare extreme economic events.
As the notion of resilience has spread across various social sciences in recent years, it 
off ered appropriate theoretical framework for utilizing possibilities off ered by new data set.
Although resilience acquired a variety of interpretations and specifi cations (Martin and 
Sunley, 2015; Modica and Reggiani, 2015; Martin, 2018), paper follows defi nition off ered by 
Walker (2004) defi ning resilience as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reor-
ganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks”. Although previously mentioned defi nition off ers space for diff erent 
approaches, the focus in this paper will be so-called ‘engineering resilience’ – how quickly a 
system, once disturbed, returns to its pre-shock state. This essentially ‘bounce back’ defi ni-
tion or type of resilience resonates most closely with the conventional view of shocks (includ-
ing recessions) in the economics literature. (Martin and Gardiner, 2019)
To deal with this perspective, two dimensions of the economic disasters are especially 
important: size and duration of economic disaster (e.g. Bordo et al., 2001). Size of economic 
disaster represent the measure of intensity of destroying economy’s productive base. Dura-
tion captures the fact that time is crucial. More precisely, keeping in mind growing mobility 
of essential growth and development factors, time for considerable change of the economy 
that will be in position to retain and attract key development factors will be crucial criteria 
that will make diff erence between successful and unsuccessful economies, especially in 
interaction with the size of the disaster. 
3. Data and Methodology 
In fi rst data set on economic disasters Barro and Ursúa (2008, 2012) defi ned economic 
disaster as macroeconomic contraction (cumulative declines of output over one or more 
years of at least 10 percent) and they identifi ed 183 economic disasters over the last two 
centuries in 42 OECD and non-OECD countries available up to 2009 while country starting 
dates vary.
Also, the data set off ers evidence for lower frequency of economic disasters after post-
World War two (WWII) and signifi cant diff erence between more developed countries (OECD 
countries) and less developed countries.  
This discrepancy between OECD and non-OECD countries suggests that increasing the 
number of countries under investigation might provide valuable additional information on 
economic disasters and this has been recognized by Coric (2019). The author created the 
new data sets based on data off ered by Maddison Project Database version 2018 (MPD) and 
Penn World Table (PWT) database described in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). The fi rst 
data set covers 169 countries up to 2016 (and for 77 countries data are available prior 1950) 
and second off ers a broader coverage of countries after the WWII as compared to the MPD, 
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by providing annual data for 212 countries from 1950 to 2014. Both datasets by providing 
not only data on the country, but also on starting and ending year, size, duration, time of 
recovery, size of population and level of development open new horizons for a variety of 
empirical researches on economic disasters.
In this paper it is decided to use data set based on PWT due to several reasons. It off ers a 
larger coverage of countries in the post-WWII period, but also by providing GDP in constant 
national prices (compared to MPD in which GDP is provided in constant US dollars), off ers a 
control for the possible eff ect of the used exchange rate on real GDP and real GDP p.c.
As indicate previously, special focus is on size and duration of the economic disaster. Cor-
relation matrix (Table 1) indicates weak and negative correlation between the size and dura-
tion of economic disasters. In addition, we fi nd important to consider (and introduce in Table 
1) relative duration, ratio between size and duration, as a measure of the intensity of eco-
nomic declining during economic disaster. The new measure (relative duration) is not corre-
late with the size and duration and therefore it represents economic phenomena that should 
be analysed.
In addition, relative duration by considering size and duration simultaneously could pro-
vide more information on these dimensions of economic disasters. 
Table 1 Correlation matrix between size, duration and relative duration of economic disasters
 | size duration R_duration
  -------------+---------------------------
 size | 1.0000
 duration | -0.4081 1.0000
 R_duration | -0.3674 -0.4138 1.0000
For empirical defi ning determinants of the size and relative duration of economic disas-
ters the paper follows complementary literature. More precisely, it follows approaches of the 
authors analyzing determinants of fi nancial and economic crisis (e.g. Park and Lee, 2001; 
Desai and Mitra, 2004; Bordo and Haubrich, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff , 2014; Dao, 2017). 
As a result, two models were constructed. Firstly, for defi ning the determinants of the size 
of economic disasters:
Sizei=α1+β1 Human capitali+β2 Institutionsi+β3 Investmenti
+γi Globalization +hi Fin.sector+ τt+ε(i,t)
Where Size denotes the cumulative loss of output in a particular disaster (as % of GDP);
 Human capital stands for Compulsory education duration (years) in particular coun-
try I;
 Institutions represent Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita);
 Investment stands for Gross capital formation (% of GDP);
 Globalization represent KOI index of globalization;
 Fin.sector denotes Domestic credit provided by fi nancial sector (% of GDP)
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τ captures time controls; e denotes the error term; i and t represent the country and time, 
respectively; while α, β and γ are the respective coeffi  cients.
Secondly, for defi ning the determinants of the relative duration (defi ned as ratio between 
duration (in years) and the size (as % of GDP) of economic disasters:
R.durationi=α1+β1  Human capitali+β2  Institutionsi+β  Investmenti
+γi  Globalization +hi Fin.sector+ τt+ε(i,t)
 Where R. duration denotes as ratio between duration of economic disaster (in years) 
and the size of economic disaster (as %of GDP); 
 Human capital stands for Compulsory education duration (years) in particular coun-
try I;
 Institutions represent Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita);
 Investment stands for Gross capital formation (% of GDP);
 Globalization represent KOI index of globalization;
 Financial sector denotes Domestic credit provided by fi nancial sector (% of GDP)
τ captures time controls; e denotes the error term; i and t represent the country and time, 
respectively; while α, β and γ are the respective coeffi  cients.
4. Empirical fi ndings and concluding remarks
The results of the static linear regression analysis using are presented in Table 2 (column 
1 for the overall size of economic disaster and column 2 for relative duration of the economic 
disaster).
Results in column 1 indicate signifi cant importance of institutions and investment. More 
precisely, higher quality of institutions decreases the size of economic disasters, while higher 
investment increases the size of economic disasters. These results can indicate that higher 
quality of institutions can provide stimulus for fi rms to innovate and become more competi-
tive even after the extreme shocks. Higher level of investments at the beginning of the eco-
nomic disaster can indicate not only lower effi  ciency and productivity of present and previ-
ous investments, but also lower capacity for investments necessary for fi rms to become more 
competitive and decline the size of economic disaster.
For relative duration of the crisis two determinants shown signifi cance. Human capital 
decreases relative duration of economic disaster indicating that human capital can stimulate 
faster positive changes after economic disaster happens. However, higher level of domestic 
credit provided by fi nancial sector has negative eff ects on relative duration indicating that in 
periods of uncertainty in fi nancial markets and rising risk aversion among investors, the neg-
ative eff ects of extracting funds and place them in other countries will be higher among 
countries with higher level of domestic credit provided by fi nancial sector .
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Table 2 Results of linear regression models
(1)  (2)
size R_duration
Human capital -1.344 1.332*
(-1.72) (2.19)












2008.start 27.80**   -1.025
 (4.04) (-0.19)
2009.start 28.53**  -0.0682
 (4.51) (-0.01)






_cons   -27.30 -4.557
(-2.08) (-0.45)
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
These results could provide valuable recommendations for policy makers. In fi rst place 
the countries with the higher probability for economic disaster (less developed countries) 
have additional reasons to implement a measures that will increase the quality of institutions 
and human capital. Simultaneously, the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of the investments and 
level of domestic credits provided by fi nancial sector should be in focus of key national 
actors. 
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Sažetak
EKONOMSKE KATASTROFE – ŠTO ZAISTA ZNAMO?
Nakon nedavne globalne fi nancijske i ekonomske krize, interes za istraživanjem učinaka velikih 
ekonomskih kriza, nazvanih ekonomskim katastrofama, je porastao. Ovaj rad analizira odrednice 
veličine i faze oporavka uslijed ekonomskih katastrofa od 1960. do 2014. za 214 država svijeta. 
Rezultati otkrivaju značajne razlike između intenziteta i trajanja gospodarskih katastrofa, a koji 
ukazuju na važnost institucija i investicija za intenzitet, te ljudskog kapitala i fi nancijskih sektora za 
fazu trajanja ekonomskih katastrofa.
Ključne riječi: ekonomske katastrofe, institucije, investicije, ljudski kapital.
